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# Governing authority through bureaucracy: conflicts over bureaucratic cadres and the rise of authoritarianism in the late Ottoman Empire (1908–1913)

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## ABSTRACT

This article presents a historical analysis of how internal power struggles and conflicts among state actors can foster the development of authoritarian systems, particularly when a political network gains exclusive control over the bureaucratic apparatus through its authority over appointments and dismissals. Focusing on the intricate power struggles and factional rivalries surrounding gubernatorial appointments between 1908 and 1913, this article aims to provide an alternative approach to understanding how the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) became the dominant governing force within the state apparatus, enabling it to pursue an authoritarian agenda.

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## Introduction

The political system in the late Ottoman Empire faced structural challenges from 1908 to 1913, prompted by the internal actors of political and bureaucratic mechanisms. One of the radical transformations following this period was the rise of authoritarianism, which has long been debated among scholars regarding its development and origin. Contrary to the general tendency to attribute the Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) attempts at formulating an authoritarian system by 1913 to either the Balkan Wars or its Jacobin origin, this article argues that the period from July 1908 to October 1912 must be reevaluated through the lens of internal bureaucratic struggles for control over the state apparatus in order to better understand the origins of authoritarianism. This article, therefore, attempts to demonstrate how political struggles for controlling appointments and dismissals among bureaucratic networks culminated in the systematic exclusion of

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certain groups and the ascendance of a specific one. It examines the extent to which these internal conflicts result in the transition towards authoritarian governance, highlighting the role of bureaucratic maneuvers in shaping the contours of political power.

During the formative stages after the 1908 Revolution, the CUP had encountered substantial resistance from the entrenched state machinery in its endeavor to administer the actual state apparatus. However, through a systematic approach, the CUP integrated into the cabinets, decision-making processes, and bureaucratic machinery up until mid-1912. In late 1912, the CUP appeared to be losing its influence within the upper echelons of politics,<sup>1</sup> but this was short-lived. By January 1913, the CUP regained full authority through a coup known as the *Bâb-ı Âlî* Raid (*Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*). This event witnessed the forcible entry of the CUP's leading figures into a government assembly, leading to the fatal incident involving the war minister, Nâzım Pasha, and the subsequent resignation of Kâmil Pasha government. The CUP then, facilitated the ascension of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, a widely respected military figure with a so-called nonpartisan reputation but close to the CUP to a certain extent, to assume full governmental control. After six months of Mahmut Şevket Pasha's control over the government, the CUP then reinforced its power after the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha in June 1913. Unlike in 1908 when the CUP cadres encountered pressure from the state apparatus of the time, there was no resistance to CUP rule in 1913. In other words, the return of the CUP to power did not prompt a backlash from the state bureaucracy. From January 1913 on, the CUP held the reins of power by eliminating all opposition groups and subsequently exercised a monopoly of power until the end of the First World War. This article argues that emerging authoritarianism was not solely a consequence of high-level political struggles but also correlated with the extent of control over the machinery of the state and the bureaucratic apparatus.

The existing literature has tended to explain the CUP's authoritarianism in two different ways. First, one group of scholars has evaluated the CUP's ideological propensity of authoritarianism as a Jacobin tradition, emphasizing continuity in radical attitudes of the Committee from its establishment. For Hanioglu, the roots of its so-called transformation into an authoritarian organization had been, in fact, evident throughout the pre-revolutionary period.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Taglia asserted that the repromulgation of the Constitution implied to a certain extent a transformation from the despotic Hamidian rule to the authoritarian regime of the CUP.<sup>3</sup> Özbek indicated that the Constitutional regime established firm social control mechanisms starting from the early Revolutionary period.<sup>4</sup> Sohrabi also focuses attention on the character of the Unionist approach, namely its 'illiberal constitutionalism' from the early periods of the Second Constitution.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, for Matossian, the 31 March Counterrevolution enhanced the CUP's

authoritarian tendencies soon after the CUP managed to suppress the Counterrevolution.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, another ideological perspective depicted by Kaynar points out that the Enlightenment ideals upon which the CUP based its intellectual origins cannot be independent from the CUP's authoritarianism.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, literature on the Second Constitutional Period has also tended to suggest that the CUP's authoritarianism became apparent over time, especially with the advent of the Balkan Wars. Göçek, for example, argued that the gradual increase in the dictatorial tendencies of the CUP is related to the Balkan Wars.<sup>8</sup> Türkyılmaz pointed that the aftermath of the Balkan Wars paved the way for 'the rise of radical versions of Turkism',<sup>9</sup> which ushered in the rise of the CUP's authoritarianism with the 1913 coup. Similarly, Kayalı also asserted that the crisis in Balkans after the late 1912 led the CUP to gain an important level of authoritarianism.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, Toprak attributed the growing authoritarian tendencies of the CUP to rebellions, constant disintegration and land losses of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>11</sup> This point was in turn criticized by Hanioglu, marking as it is a delusion that 'the authoritarian character of the CUP regime as an unforeseen and surprising outcome, frequently attributed to the corruption of power or viewed as a response to external developments.'<sup>12</sup> For Öztan, the literature regarding the Balkan Wars falls into the trap of teleology since the defeat was considered as an effective power behind the subsequent events took place after the Balkan Wars.<sup>13</sup>

This research, rather, illustrates that in-state conflicts and power struggles for controlling the bureaucratic mechanism may also cause the emergence of authoritarian systems in that different networks can manage to consolidate appointments and dismissals to establish a monopoly of power within the state bureaucracy. In other words, this study argues that the contestations over filling bureaucratic positions among different networks ultimately led to the marginalization or elimination of some networks, thereby accelerating the dominance of one over the others by monopolizing the power over appointments. In this respect, the Young Turks' case shows that the CUP was able to establish a CUP-loyal bureaucracy by monopolizing state-centered mechanisms of appointments and dismissals. Regardless of whether it was a process planned by the CUP, this article addresses how struggles within the bureaucratic mechanism over appointing cadres resulted in the emergence of monolithic power for appointments. This process contributed to the emergence of authoritarian rule by the CUP in the post-1913 period, as the initial five years of Constitutional Rule (1908–1913) saw CUP elites endeavoring to populate the bureaucratic ranks with individuals demonstrating allegiance to their organization. Establishing a monolithic state bureaucracy that made the CUP appear as an unrivaled organization ultimately enabled it to attain the features of an authoritarian regime. In the subsequent discussion, these will be explored through a specific case study: gubernatorial appointments in the late Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1912.

Methodologically, there are several ways to trace civil appointment rates, including state yearbooks (*salnâme*), newspapers, archival documentation and secondary sources. The *tevcihât-ı mülkiye defterleri*<sup>14</sup> (civil appointment records) systematically recorded gubernatorial appointments between 19 August 1908 and 9 October 1912.<sup>15</sup> However, despite its comprehensive nature, including both the current and previous duties of governors (as seen in the Appendix), the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye* does not provide information on the affiliations of these governors, such as whether they were Unionists, aligned with other networks or ideologies, or without such connections. Therefore, tracing the networking backgrounds of all governors is challenging. Memoirs, archival documents, and some secondary sources offer valuable information for analyzing these connections. In situations where there is a lack of primary and secondary sources explicitly stating connections and where social relationships cannot be definitively determined, this article suggests an alternative approach to understanding governors' possible dispositions. It argues that tracing the 'career paths' of governors provides insights into their potential political inclinations. Being appointed or dismissed within similar political contexts may indicate that these governors shared certain characteristics. Although it is not possible to prove that they were connected, it offers a preliminary understanding that their career trajectories were influenced by similar directions. Consequently, this study focuses on the career trajectories of governors whose stories can be traced through the analysis of primary and secondary sources.

### Networking of the Unionist governors

In a recent study, Erik J. Zürcher argued that before 1913, it was rare for leading Unionists to secure high-level administrative or military positions in the provinces. According to Zürcher, Ahmed Cemal Bey stands out as a notable exception for Unionist networks' bureaucratic attempt to appoint governors. He was appointed as governor-general in Adana after the 1909 events and then moved to Baghdad in 1911 due to tensions between local Unionist leaders and Nazım Pasha. Zürcher maintained that such occurrences were uncommon for the era spanning 1908–1912.<sup>16</sup>

Nonetheless, documentation demonstrates that the CUP made significant efforts to ensure the appointment of individuals affiliated with the Committee. Indeed, a respectful ideologue of the Young Turks, Bahaeddin Şakir, claimed that all ranks of the bureaucracy must be 'chosen from the loyal and self-sacrificing members of the Committee.'<sup>17</sup> For instance, on 13 December 1908, Fahri Pasha was appointed as the governor of Monastir upon the suggestion of the CUP central committee (*Merkez-i Umûmî*). His appointment is a significant example because the document directly shows the influence of the CUP in his promotion by stating that his appointment

realized ‘upon the request of CUP’s Central Committee.’<sup>18</sup> Indeed, three months earlier, the Committee had demanded from the government that Fahri be promoted to district police inspector, yet the request had been declined.<sup>19</sup> Other examples can be cited, such as Hacı Adil Bey, who became the Secretary-General of the CUP in 1910 and Minister of the Interior in 1911, and was working in the customs directorate in Selanik when he became governor of Edirne in 1909.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, when Ali Münif Bey was appointed governor of Ankara in 1910 he was thirty-six – young for a bureaucrat to become governor compared to other appointees.<sup>21</sup> His biography elucidates how he, along with a faction within the CUP’s central committee, ascended to the governorship as a result of the Committee’s initiatives:

After two years as a member of parliament, I returned to the administrative tribe abiding by a decision of the CUP Central Committee itself. The decision of CUP Central Committee was as such: Most of the governors in the provinces were weak. Particularly, they could not adjust to the new rules of the administrative system. For the constitutional regime to take root, it must benefit from people in parliament. Therefore, five or six colleagues were requested to return to governorships. Talat particularly insisted for me.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, Mazhar Bey’s swift rise to the governorship of Kosova exemplifies this trend. He was consecutively appointed governor of Edirne in 1910 and subsequently of Halep in 1911. Danişmend pointed out that the CUP initiated a systematic replacement of experienced governors, originally appointed by Sultan Abdülhamid, with novices lacking essential administrative skills. Among these appointees was Mazhar Bey, who was not only inexperienced but also reportedly entangled in clandestine organizations within the Balkans:

After Sultan Hamid’s trained and experienced governors, the Committee of Union and Progress began to appoint inexperienced and ineffective men to the major governorships of that time, solely because they were Unionists. Among these are even some committee member officers! For example, the Governor of Kosovo, Mazhar Bey, although essentially a civilian, is an inexperienced committee member (*komitacı*).<sup>23</sup>

This shift underscored a dramatic departure from established governance practices, reflecting the CUP’s broader political strategy during that tumultuous period. İbrahim Hayrullah Bey, a distinguished Unionist, experienced a notable rise in his political career, being appointed as the governor of Selanik in 1909 and later ascending to the governorship of Istanbul in 1912. His trajectory took a pivotal turn following the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*, after which he was designated as the Minister of Law in 1913. This appointment marked a significant milestone in his career, epitomizing the influence and reach of the Unionist cadre. The case of Mehmed Reşid Pasha is emblematic

of individuals within the Balkan nexus of the CUP who transitioned to high-ranking bureaucratic positions. As noted by Çankaya, Mehmed Reşid Pasha was reportedly among those who dispatched decisive telegrams from the Balkans – particularly from Serres – to the Yıldız Palace on July 20, 1908.<sup>24</sup> These telegrams contained explicit threats to Sultan Abdülhamid II, urging the re-establishment of the constitution. This act was not only a bold political statement but also a clear demonstration of the growing assertiveness and influence of the CUP's Balkan contingent within the Ottoman political sphere.

Mehmed Reşid's CUP connections dated to his days as a bureaucrat in Selanik where he attended secret meetings of Young Turks long before his appointment as the sub-governor of Serres in 1906. As early as 1896, he was one of the figures who constituted the secret Committee in Selanik, and he continued to serve the Committee as a low-ranking bureaucrat in the Balkans. However, despite maintaining his presence in the organization for years, he did not take on roles within the Committee. As a part of the Balkan network, the human resource pool of the Committee, he was promoted to governor of Edirne<sup>25</sup> twenty days after Committee members first sent their telegrams to Yıldız Palace. After serving as governor of Edirne, he was appointed as the governor of *Cezayir Bahr-i Sefid* in 1910, Monastir in 1911, Ankara in 1912, Kastamonu in 1914, and Sivas in 1919.<sup>26</sup>

These cases can be increased in number, but certain cases also reveal that people embedded in the CUP network in 1908 became opponents soon after the revolution. The case of Mehmed Ali Aynî exemplifies how a bureaucrat, even when aligning with Unionist principles,<sup>27</sup> could find himself estranged from the CUP by decisions made at the central committee level.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the opposite could also be followed. Kırmızı points to one group of bureaucrats of the former regime who converted wholesale to the Young Turk ideology after the Revolution.<sup>29</sup> Although it is evident that the CUP did not constitute a monolithic group, as internal conflicts, defections, and the inclusion of new external members illustrate, this reality did not change the fact that certain governors were appointed with the support of the CUP's *Merkez-i Umûmî*. Many governors navigated their career paths through this dynamic relationship, and their career trajectories were significantly shaped by this interaction. However, it warrants consideration that alongside those overtly affiliated with the CUP, there existed another category of bureaucrats, who were ostensibly neutral but were inextricably intertwined with the state apparatus and played a pivotal role in the administrative machinations of the time.

### **The target governors**

Supporters of the Hamidian Regime who had held positions in the Hamidian bureaucratic order were bypassed when new governor appointments began

in the post 1908 period. The new order avoided appointing governors who were marked as Hamidian. Local actors sick of the Hamidian order had already denounced them as frauds and tyrants. On August 7, 1908, *Tanin* reported that the ‘contaminated cruel spies’ of the former Hamidian regime were discharged from their duties as governors including the governors of Hijaz, Erzurum, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Beirut, and Adana, respectively Râtıb, Abdü'l-vehâb, Ferid, Fuad, Mehmed Ali, and Bahri Pashas.<sup>30</sup>

Apart from the state bureaucrats who were labeled as Sultanists, there can be mentioned a group of bureaucrats who were appointed during the Hamidian period but seemed more neutral. Indeed, for the Committee, these governors were both experienced and congenial, fitting with Kırımızi’s ‘*ideolojik irtidât*’.<sup>31</sup> This, in fact, could have proven advantageous during a time when the Unionists lacked the presence of experienced bureaucratic cadres as governors in the emerging era. Moreover, these governors were also in demand because most had had good relations with local actors as they had the respect of the local *eşrâf* during their previous governorships. These were targets – in a positive sense – as the resources of the CUP were insufficient to fill local governorships. The relationship was reciprocal: the CUP benefited from these governors’ experience, and the governors maintained their presence in the bureaucratic mechanism.

It must be clarified that these target governors did not constitute a network like the CUP-affiliated governors. They were not necessarily in contact with one another and did not help one another. They were rather a group of people who shared only the limited characteristics of being experienced, neutral, nonpartisan, and disinterested in the politics in Istanbul, all of which were a means of survival during the complex early revolutionary period. Their experience as governors before the revolution appealed to the CUP leadership, and they were approached by the core CUP network individually.

A significant example was Mehmed Tevfik Bey,<sup>32</sup> one of few governors to write an autobiography that details his time as governor.<sup>33</sup> This source is significant not only as a presentation of a governor’s life, but also as a primer for how a governor in the early revolutionary period should act given the rapidly evolving situation. As the son of a bureaucrat with an *ulama* background, Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, Mehmed Tevfik was born in Istanbul in 1867. He graduated from *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in 1885 summa cum laude. After brief employment as an official in the *Bâb-ı Âli* chamber of translation (*Bâb-ı Ali Tercüme Kalemi*), he was appointed to Yıldız Palace as an amanuensis in the department of the chamberlain. After more than a decade in this position, he was appointed as the sub-governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Jerusalem in 1897. In 1901, he was promoted to governor of Selanik, and then to Konya and Yemen in 1902 and 1904, respectively. In 1906, he became the comptroller general of the Court of Accounts (*Divân-ı Muhasebât Reisi*).



He returned to being a governor when he was appointed to Bursa (*Hüdaven-digar*) in 1907, and finally he became a member of the Council of the State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) on 18 September 1909.

When the constitution was repromulgated, Mehmed Tevfik Bey was serving as the governor of Bursa where he learned of the decision of the sultan to reopen parliament on 24 July 1908. When he received the telegram from Said Pasha, Mehmed Tevfik Bey approached it with suspicion. In his own words:

I could not believe my eyes! As I did not think it possible for the sultan to restore the constitution again, I also could not accept that Said Pasha may have lost his mind. The way the telegram was written was bizarre ... I wondered whether Sultan Abdülhamid had repromulgated the constitution voluntarily, or under duress. Or might he have made the pronouncement out of vanity towards the Europeans. Maybe all of these were a way to eliminate the opposition with a politics of distraction. Or was he trying to understand who would act and how in order to oppress them afterwards.<sup>34</sup>

The day the telegram reached Bursa was uneventful. At one point, another telegram arrived from the CUP Central Committee to the CUP center in Bursa. Mehmed Tevfik Bey indicated that since nobody knew who exactly the addressee of the telegram was, the telegraph official asked him where it should be sent. In the end, it was decided that the telegram should be sent to the municipality. The telegram indicated that the constitution had been repromulgated on account of the CUP's own efforts and devotion. Later that day, when the addressees of telegram visited Mehmed Tevfik Bey, the mystery ended. Actually, he already knew them. Most were bureaucrats in different strata of the state service, but he had not known that they were affiliated with the CUP.<sup>35</sup>

The CUP center in Bursa hoped to benefit from Mehmed Tevfik Bey, as he was a highly experienced governor and statesman. He had no links to the CUP organically, but he was also not entirely satisfied with the former regime. As his memoir attests, CUP members approached him in various ways, even before the revolution, without his knowledge. During the first days of the revolution, they often visited Mehmed Tevfik's office and home. In celebration of the revolution, CUP members marched with a bevy of people to his house to administer an oath of his loyalty to the constitution.<sup>36</sup>

The most significant example of how the CUP approached what this study calls 'target' governors in the provinces was a meeting between the governor Mehmed Tevfik and the CUP members of Bursa center. The CUP members came to the office of the governor to persuade him regarding certain *personae non gratae* whom they wished to be dismissed from duty immediately. CUP members would then determine their replacements. Mehmed Tevfik admitted in his memoir that he accepted the CUP's demands though he

believed that some officials were innocent and did not deserve to be discharged.<sup>37</sup> He added that all such decisions were taken in consultation with CUP members during this delicate time.<sup>38</sup>

It is clear that the CUP leadership hoped to benefit from the experience of bureaucrats despite possible links to the former regime. On the one hand, these bureaucrats were a positive target for further the CUP's agenda. On the other hand, they were a negative target if they continued to act as if they were loyal to the former regime. The CUP method of avoiding the pitfalls of appointing such bureaucrats was that they established tight control over their actions and surveilled them. Sometimes they showcased their actions in the press, as in Tahir Pasha's case, as well as in many others.

Arîfî Pasha, for example, was the deputy-governor (*vali vekîli*) of Diyarbakir when the revolution was first attempted. He was also the sub-governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Mardin, a position he had held before he became becoming deputy-governor of Diyarbakir on 7 March 1908.<sup>39</sup> After five months, on 6 August 1908, during the first purges, he was promoted from his main position as the sub-governor of Mardin to governor of Trabzon.<sup>40</sup> His political standing can be postulated in different ways. His rapid promotion in August 1908 could have resulted from his CUP links, but he had had good relations with the former regime as well. His promotions before August 1908 were merit-based as he already held the position of governor before the revolution. He had been granted the title of *Rumeli Beylerbeyi* during the Hamidian period on 29 August 1907.<sup>41</sup> It can be speculated that his appointment as governor of Trabzon in the early revolutionary period was similar to that of Tahir Pasha. This research uncovered no primary sources indicating an organic link to the CUP leadership, but they may have hoped to benefit from his experience. Although he was outside of the CUP network, he was one of the welcomed governors approached by the CUP leadership.

Target governors were officials who had no organic connections to either the CUP or other significant networks. However, their services were still required; thus, regardless of changes in government, they were regularly appointed to positions, even though they had actively served under the Hamidian regime. In cases where the CUP lacked sufficient human resources to fill governor positions, the target governors, who seemed neutral, were valuable assets to be utilized for their experience. The CUP strategically appeared close to the target governors, perceiving this approach as advantageous in their ongoing conflict with the Istanbulites.

### **The Istanbulites<sup>42</sup>**

In instances where primary and secondary sources do not clearly establish connections and social relationships cannot be conclusively identified, this article, as stated earlier, proposes an alternative method to discern governors'

potential dispositions. The argument is made that examining their 'career paths' can reveal insights into their likely networks. The appointment or dismissal of governors within comparable political contexts might suggest that these officials shared certain traits. While it cannot be definitively proven that they were connected, this approach provides an initial understanding that their career movements were shaped by similar influences.

This study has recognized that certain governors were collectively appointed or dismissed within same political contexts. Although it is difficult to assert that they were part of a well-connected organization, many of them shared certain characteristics. The Istanbulites were a sort of umbrella group that included bureaucrats with diverse political backgrounds. Although concrete evidence supporting their collection under the same ideal for complete bureaucratic control, akin to the CUP, is lacking, the patterns of promotions and dismissals display a parallelism with the political trajectory of the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*. What they shared in common was that they were raised in Istanbul, they were mostly the sons of pashas, and they had worked in the higher strata of the bureaucracy in Istanbul at some point in their life. Moreover, most came from wealthy families.

Tahir Pasha's case exemplifies how a network of non-CUP origins worked for certain existing governors as one of the parties within the umbrella of the Istanbul based bureaucrats. The CUP, in fact, made overtures to governors who had links to the Hamidian regime before the revolution but hoped to survive in the new constitutional regime. Tahir Pasha was the former governor of Mosul from 1889 to 1891, Van from 1898 to 1906, and Bitlis from 1907 to August 1908. He was among those discharged after the repromulgation of the constitution, but he was tasked again with the governorship of Erzurum after the dismissal of Abdü'l-Vahab Pasha in August 1908. His reappointment during heated moments of high-level dismissals during the early days of the revolution confirms that the CUP was content with tiny distinctions to benefit from the experience of governors whose were not as disreputable as Ratib or Abdü'l-Vahab Pashas. His governorship suited the CUP's purposes because of his experience like the target governors mentioned above.

Nevertheless, the CUP leadership kept an eye on him since he had links to the former Hamidian regime. Eight months after his appointment as the governor, he quarreled with the newly appointed Erzurum chief of police, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was a CUP supporter. The quarrel ended with the discharge of Mehmed Emin Efendi on 20 March 1909.<sup>43</sup> After his dismissal, Mehmed Emin petitioned the central government about his 'unfair discharge' upon which the central government launched an investigation into the claims of the former chief of police.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, six days after Mehmed Emin's petition, an official letter from the Ministry of the Interior demanded information from the Fourth Army and the Action Army

regarding newspaper reports about Tahir Pasha's activities defying the constitutional administration.<sup>45</sup> The report was first published by *Neyyir-i Hakikât*, a CUP-linked newspaper based in Bitola, on May 5, 1909.<sup>46</sup> On May 12, the exact same report was published in the Istanbul-based *Saadet Gazetesi*.<sup>47</sup> After five more days, on May 18, the Ministry of the Interior demanded information regarding these speculations about Tahir Pasha. On May 20, a telegram was sent to the Ministry of the Interior from the Commander (*müşir*) of the Fourth Army, İbrahim Pasha, in reply.<sup>48</sup> İbrahim Pasha denounced Tahir Pasha, together with Commander Yusuf Pasha, for mischievously sending telegrams to bureaucrats around Erzurum opposing constitutional rule. On May 29, the Ministry of the Interior discharged Tahir Pasha from the governorship of Erzurum.<sup>49</sup>

However, this was not the end of his story. Indeed, he applied to the retirement fund for a pension soon after his dismissal from the governorship.<sup>50</sup> Although the central government initially accepted his request,<sup>51</sup> they subsequently invited him to the Sublime Porte three months later. On December 28, 1909, Tahir Pasha arrived at the Sublime Porte for 'advisement on certain questions'.<sup>52</sup> The related documents do not detail the content of the meeting, but tellingly, after two months, Tahir Pasha was reappointed as the governor of Bitlis.<sup>53</sup> Notwithstanding the recent discredit on him, it was a mystery how he was re-appointed again, during the last days of Hilmi Pasha cabinet. Moreover, his service maintained until he was appointed to Mosul in August 1910, which was his last duty in the state service.

Ali Daniş Bey was another example. According to Karabekir, Daniş Bey was one of the early members of the CUP's Istanbul center, which was thought to be established apart from Paris and Selanik centres.<sup>54</sup> It could indeed explain the fact that he was appointed to Selanik as the governor soon after the revolution in August. However, the later evidence shows that Daniş Bey had quarreled with the center as he was dismissed soon after his appointment.<sup>55</sup>

Daniş Bey originally came from a wealthy family with strong aristocratic bonds. To name a few, his father and grandfather were Abdurrahman and Yaşar Pashas of Pristina who were prestigious in the district. Yahya Kemal notes that Dâniş Bey, as a dignitary in the Istanbul, was well-educated and believed in science and progress.<sup>56</sup> For a long time, he worked as an official in the St. Petersburg Embassy. In 1902, when Yahya Kemal met him, Daniş Bey was a prosecutor in the court of the first instance (*Bidayet Mahkemesi Müddeiumûmîsi*). However, his influence went beyond that of an ordinary prosecutor since he was head chamberlain's son-in-law.<sup>57</sup> Yet his rise as a bureaucrat started with the revolution. A secretly anti-Hamidian bureaucrat, he was appointed as the governor of Selanik on 10 August 1908 as stated above.<sup>58</sup> However, this did not last long, and he was appointed to the committee of inspectorates (*heyett-i teftişiye riyaseti*) on 10 December

1908.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, there was no reason for his dismissal other than a single letter of complaint.<sup>60</sup> The CUP may simply not have wanted him as a governor of a such a symbolically significant city for the CUP given that Daniş Bey was not a clear CUP supporter. On 13 November 1909, he demanded a compensation wage for having been dismissed from the Selanik governorship.<sup>61</sup> The ideological differences between the CUP members and Daniş Bey became apparent when the cabinet of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was announced in 1912. For three months, Dâniş Bey served in the Ministry of the Interior before being appointed as the governor of Hüdavendigar. Daniş Bey's case is significant considering that the CUP was not alone in struggling to fill bureaucratic cadres. Those who opposed the Hamidian Regime but still had close relations with Istanbul-based bureaucrats and did not wish to share the power with the supporters of national sovereignty (*hakimiyet-i milliye*)<sup>62</sup> – even if they were inexperienced young civil and military officers – were recruited into this struggle.

İbrahim Edhem Bey (İbrahim Edhem Mesut Dirvana), a well-educated bureaucrat who graduated from the *Mülkiye* in 1885 and the Sorbonne in 1893, was not affiliated with CUP-linked bureaucrats although his career path was paralleled that of those with organic links to the Young Turks. His father, Mesut Bey, was an official in the *Duyûn-u Umûmiye İdaresi* when İbrahim Edhem started his career as an unpaid (*mülâzemet*) dragoman<sup>63</sup> in the foreign ministry while still a high school student in 1885. After finding success there, he was appointed as an official in Yıldız Palace (*Mabeyn-i Hümayûn*). In 1889, he was sent abroad as a governor fellow for higher education to the Sorbonne. After his graduation, he returned to Istanbul and resumed his former duty in the palace until he resigned and requested transfer to the foreign office. Over the next four years he was employed at the embassies of Brussels, Washington, and London. He returned to Istanbul in 1897 as a well-educated, experienced bureaucrat. He resigned from the foreign office in 1898 and was appointed a member of the Council of the State (*Şurâ-yı Devlet Azası*). Given his educational level and his life as an intellectual abroad (he translated Descartes' *Discourse de la Méthode* into Ottoman Turkish, for example) one might expect a connection to the Young Turks, but there is no concrete evidence that he was a sympathizer. His aloofness from the Young Turks could have resulted from his career path through the highest levels of the bureaucracy. Until 1908, he continued at the Council of the State and held several other positions, as well. Like Daniş Bey, he was appointed as a governor soon after the revolution, but his duty as the governor of Beirut did not last. Like Daniş Bey, he was dismissed soon after being appointed and sent to be the sub-governor of Tirgovişte in the Balkans.<sup>64</sup> In August 1912, he was reappointed as the governor of Beirut during the Grand Cabinet of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, which again parallels the story of Daniş Bey.

There are other, similar cases. Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha, for example, was a highly experienced statesman born in 1838.<sup>65</sup> He was appointed as the governor of Aydın in August 1908 while he was the mayor (*şehremini*) of Istanbul. His father, Şerif Osman Pasha, was governor of Bosnia and was awarded the title of vizier in 1861.<sup>66</sup> After serving in various strata of the bureaucracy, Rauf Pasha was first appointed as governor in 1889. In the nineteen years from 1889 until 1908, when he became the *şehremini* very soon before the Revolution, he was appointed to seven different *vilayets*. His position as the mayor of Istanbul did not last longer when he was dismissed very soon after the Revolution, on 27 July 1908. During the time that the Young Turk organization was transforming into a well-organized committee in 1906 and 1907, Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha was notably the governor of Selanik. Unfortunately, there is no record of the relationship between the pasha and the Committee during his governorship. While his appointment as the mayor soon before the July 1908 could suggest that he had good relations Abdülhamid, after nine days as mayor, he was detracted from Istanbul as he appointed as the governor of Aydın.<sup>67</sup> In February 1909, he was dismissed from the governorship and appointed to the position of extraordinary commissioner (*Mısır fevkalâde komiseri*) to Egypt, where he remained until 1912. Like Daniş and Edhem Beys, he would not hold another position between 1913 and 1919 during the time the CUP held absolute political power over the state apparatus. In 1919, he became the head of the Council of the State (*Şura-yı Devlet Reisi*) when the CUP lost power.

Another example could be Ahmed Reşid Bey's services as governor. Before the revolution, he had connections with Arab İzzet Pasha, a famous pasha within the close circle of Abdülhamid, which can be understood from Reşid Bey's memoir.<sup>68</sup> Although Reşid Bey's memoir seems in certain cases to show Abdülhamid as a proper ruler, it cannot be said that his relationship with the sultan seemed good as his memoir tells. For example, after returning from Reşid Bey's Bitola governorship in 1906, Arab İzzet Pasha recommended Reşid Bey to become the governor of Edirne, while the sultan rejected because Reşid Bey had close relations with Osman Pasha before.<sup>69</sup> Although he mentions that the sultan was an intelligent person, he also criticized the sultan's apprehensive personality.<sup>70</sup> Yet he always plums for the sultans' politics.

During the early days of the Revolution, he was the governor of Ankara where he was appointed in 1907. Soon after the Revolution, he was appointed to the Haleb as the governor of the *vilâyet*. For Çankaya, 'the reason behind this could not be understood'.<sup>71</sup> Soon after the 1909 Constitutional Amendment in August, he was dismissed from governorship of Haleb when Fahri Pasha, a reliable governor for the CUP,<sup>72</sup> was appointed in return. He taught literature classes at *Galatasaray Sultânisi* as he did not serve within the governmental service anymore until the August 1912 when the Grand

Cabinet was formed. He was among the founding members of *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*.<sup>73</sup> Yet, after the August 1912, he returned to the governorship as the governor of Aydın and after the three months as a governor, he became the interior minister until the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* in January 1913.

The career trajectories of certain governors suggest the existence of a group opposing the CUP's political and intra-state organizations. These governors shared specific characteristics: (1) many were descendants of pashas or high-level statesmen in Istanbul, often sons or grandsons and (2) they maintained close relationships with former Hamidian regime supporters or CUP opponents. The specific cases of Tahir Pasha, Daniş Bey, İbrahim Edhem Bey, Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha and Ahmed Reşid Bey reveal a conflict within the bureaucracy in terms of controlling appointments. These cases demonstrate three significant points. First, although there is not concrete evidence that the Istanbulites contacted each other regularly as a well-organized network, these cases and others reveal a network of people acting in concert. The dates of their appointments and dismissals prove this. However, their organizational structure is unclear, which is why we can call the Istanbulites a 'non-organized' network, unlike the organized network of the CUP. Since we do not know the scope and structure of this network of Istanbulites, we can only call it an arbitrary network of people acting simultaneously with awareness of each other as a network of bureaucrats and politicians opposing the activities of the Unionist fractions within the bureaucracy.

### Alterations in the political balance vis-à-vis gubernatorial appointments

The period between July 1908 and January 1913 was characterized by the attempts of various political actors to seize political power, including both the government and parliament. The CUP readjusted its strategy in accordance with the flow of politics. While at certain times it struggled to concentrate executive and legislative power in parliament, as in the period from the March 31 Incident until late 1909, at other times the CUP sought to fill the government with its own members, as it did after January 1910.

Starting in the early days of the revolution through May 1912, the CUP's power rose on occasion, yet there were limitations it needed to overcome. Mahmut Şevket Pasha's growing power after May 1909 was an example. Although the CUP and Mahmut Şevket Pasha seemed in certain cases to work collaboratively, neither of the parties sought a long-lasting alliance. The Unionists were aware that Mahmut Şevket Pasha could cause trouble. For Akşin, Mahmut Şevket Paşa was a 'big brother' for the Committee who often warned and admonished Unionist leaders.<sup>74</sup> Even so, there is no indication that those in Mahmut Şevket Pasha's circle meddled in the appointment of governors.



The actual conflicts seemed to occur between the CUP and the Istanbul based bureaucrats. It would be expected that given the political fluctuations, appointment rates would gradually favor whoever increased their political power. In other words, changes to the political atmosphere would trigger a changeover in bureaucratic power; the increasing influence of certain groups would also strengthen their influence vis-à-vis bureaucratic appointments. It would be expected, for example, that the power of the CUP in the bureaucratic area would have decreased in the second half of 1910. The CUP's power vis-à-vis its opponents weakened with Cavid's attempts to find foreign debt. Moreover, problems in Macedonia were attributed to Talat Bey's inability to overcome them as Minister of the Interior, resulting in his resignation in February 1911. The emergence of the *Hizb-i Cedid* (the New Faction), the ascending power of an anti-CUP coalition, and the Turco-Italian War caused a significant loss of the CUP's power in high politics.<sup>75</sup> A strong attempt by the CUP to wrest political power in early 1912 seemed to affect power relations in the bureaucracy positively. However, the push did not last, and the CUP lost its position with the emergence of *Halaskar Zâbitân*.

But this study argues that until the second half of 1912, the CUP, without interruption, increased its influence over governor appointments. Although its influence in the high political field fluctuated to an extent, this was not reflected in the bureaucratic arena. Appointments of CUP-backed governors continued until the Muhtar Pasha Cabinet was formed in summer 1912. The subsequent dismissals of CUP-linked governors that started in fall 1912 were accompanied by an increase in the appointments of Istanbul-based bureaucrats.

Although they existed long before the *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası* was established, the Istanbulites coordinated with its intellectual backers, and the party openly supported the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha cabinet although Muhtar Pasha did not publicly support *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası*.<sup>76</sup> Governor turnover rates during this cabinet indicate an important shift for both the CUP and Istanbul-based bureaucrats. In August, September, and October 1912, the bureaucracy endured significant turnover that favored the Istanbulites over CUP-linked bureaucrats. Ali Münif Bey, who was the governor of Monastir at the time, mentioned in his memoir that the Grand Cabinet was politically neutral on the surface. However, for him, the truth was different.<sup>77</sup> As soon as the cabinet was formed, they started a purge of CUP-linked governors, a fury that included Ali Münif Bey. Behçet Bey, who had closer ties to the Istanbulites, was appointed as the governor of Manastır<sup>78</sup> after Ali Münif Bey's dismissal. The case of Mehmed Galib Bey, the son of Mehmed Said Efendi, a former Interior Minister in the Hamidian period, also exemplifies how conflicts within the bureaucracy coincided with disruptions of the political balance. In 1902, he was appointed as the sub-governor of Manisa



where he remained until being dismissed from duty in 1909. He was not reappointed until the Grand Cabinet was established. He was then first appointed as the sub-governor of Beyoğlu, which was a significant, symbolic position. He was then appointed as the governor of Kastamonu in September 1912.<sup>79</sup> Soon, he was dismissed from his duty. For Birinci, the reason behind his dismissal was that 'he was not an easy-going person getting on well with the prominent Unionists.'<sup>80</sup>

On the one hand, all of examples above reveal that the sequences of gubernatorial appointments provide significant insights into the networks of state officials. On the other hand, this picture also illustrates that certain political transitions and shifts in government caused fluctuations in gubernatorial appointment rates. The fluctuating turnover rates linked to changes in government demonstrate that similar transitions occurred within the bureaucratic structure. Consequently, understanding the relationship between government changes and increasing appointment rates could be attributed to the presence of competing agents and networks within the bureaucracy vying for bureaucratic positions. Data in the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye defterleri*, presented in Figure 1, allow for an analysis of these turnover trends.

Demonstrating the monthly distribution of gubernatorial appointments, Figure 1 shows that until early 1909, turnover rates were average, but nearly ceased during the 31 March Counterrevolution. However, after the counterrevolution was suppressed, turnover rates swiftly increased. Notably, during the early months of Hüseyin Hilmi's government, starting in February 1909, gubernatorial appointments remained below average until July 1909. This indeed supports the argument that turnover rates within the state apparatus were limited until the 31 March Counterrevolution was suppressed. Yet, after 31 March, the CUP found an opportunity





Figure 1. Monthly Governor Appointments. Source: BOA *Tevcihât- Mülkiye Defterleri*.

to legislate, aligning with Feroz Ahmad's terminology, '*meşrutî ıslahat*' (Constitutional Reformation).<sup>81</sup> Another peak was during the process following the constitutional amendment in August 1909, this was followed by a ten-month period of low appointment rates lasting until mid-1910. In fact, the 31 March Incident, the amendment of the constitution, and the enactment of fundamental new laws occupied the agenda of the *meclis-i umûmî* and the office of *sadrâzâm* until Hüseyin Hilmi's resignation in late December 1909. The Hakkı Pasha cabinet was established in January 1910, and three months after forming the government, only after April 1910, it accelerated the pace of gubernatorial appointments. Despite a change in government during this period – when Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned on 28 December 1909 due to his inability to pass the budget and certain laws<sup>82</sup> – the new cabinet under Hakkı Pasha made gubernatorial appointments only when necessary.

A few factors explain this cabinet's differing approach to interior affairs. In fact, the Hakkı Pasha cabinet, soon after its formation, faced an important challenge: the Albanian uprising. In April–May 1910, the Albanians reacted against the new centralization policies being implemented by the CUP-linked governor, Mazhar Bey.<sup>83</sup> The government tried to address the problems in İşkodra, but the uprising in Rumelia recalled previous uprisings in Eastern Anatolia. The government understood that events in Rumelia could easily trigger subsequent uprisings in the eastern provinces. For this reason, the government may have concentrated its efforts on gubernatorial appointments in various turbulent regions. After the fall of the Hakkı Pasha cabinet, and with the onset of the Turco-Italian War in the fall of 1911, Said Pasha formed a cabinet for the second time since the re-promulgation of the constitution. Cooperating with the CUP, the Said Pasha cabinet of 1911 and 1912 lasted much longer than his first in July 1908. During the cabinet's nine-month tenure, the number of governors moving in and out was slightly lower. As his cabinet inherited the Albanian uprising along with the Turco-Italian War, the primary concern was not interior matters.


However, one of the most radical shifts in the frequency of governor appointments took place after the formation of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's cabinet in July 1912. The heatmap of monthly appointment rates in Figure 2 illustrates this transformation. One can see that there were three distinct periods during which the monthly appointment rates exceeded ten: (1) following the suppression of the 31 March Counterrevolution; (2) after the 1909 Constitutional Amendment; and (3) upon the formation of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's cabinet. Indeed, the process leading to the formation of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's cabinet warrants particular attention, as the events following May 1912 reveal a significant narrative in terms of understanding the extent of intra-state struggles for controlling appointments.



**Figure 2.** Heatmap of Governor Appointments. Source: BOA *Tevcihât- Mükiye Defterleri*.

The period from May 1912 until the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* in January 1913 was significant in the political history of the CUP because the *Halaskâr Zâbitân* (Redeemer Officers) emerged as a major opposition to the CUP. After Said Pasha's resignation and the formation of the Grand Cabinet under Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the CUP lost its power in the executive as the new government began dismissing CUP-linked governors and replacing them with new ones. In fact, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha undertook a massive campaign to appoint new governors, surpassing any other government established during the period between August 1908 and October 1912. Analysis of the *Tevcihat-ı Mülkiye* data (as seen in Figure 3) reveals a higher frequency of gubernatorial appointments per ten-day period during the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha Cabinet compared to previous administrations. This figure reveals that per ten-day period, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha appointed 2.73 governors, Kamil Pasha 1.71, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha 1.20, Hakkı Pasha 0.69, and Said Pasha 0.95. It means that Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's governor appointment rates per ten-day period is 59.65 percent more than Kamil Pasha's cabinet formed soon after the Revolution, and 295.65 percent more than Hakkı Pasha's cabinet during 1910 and 1911. Therefore, it is evident that Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was working to appoint new governors, aiming to purge CUP-related governors.

However, not only the statistics but also personal narratives illustrate how rivalries over gubernatorial appointments took place. Alaaddin Bey, the sub-



**Figure 3.** Governor Appointment Rates per Ten-Day Period. Source: BOA *Tevcihât-Mûkiye Defterleri*.

governor of Priştine, was dismissed from his duty under the political climate that the CUP was experiencing a strict opposition during the last days of the Hilmi Pasha cabinet on 13 December 1909. It must be recalled that the CUP and the government started to disagree on certain political matters, such as Lynch Company and Bulgaria, which led the resignation of the Hilmi Pasha cabinet.<sup>84</sup> Soon before the governmental change, Alaaddin Bey was dismissed from the *mutasarrıflık* of Priştine. After a year without appointing to a sub-governor position, he then was appointed, in fact promoted, as the lieutenant governor of Sivas during the January 1911.<sup>85</sup> As Pakalın stated, it was written in his *sicill* that because of his merit in governance, he deserved to be appointed as the governor of Sivas as a substitute (*vekâleten*).<sup>86</sup> After eight months, he then was appointed as the principal (*asâleten*) governor of Sivas.<sup>87</sup> During the June 1912, soon before the CUP started to lose political power vis-à-vis the opponents, a man named Osman Paşazade Halid was arrested because he wrote a complaint against Alaaddin Bey.<sup>88</sup> The reason behind his arrest was that he used libelous language against Alaaddin Bey and the Interior Ministry. Osman Paşazade Halid was released shortly, but he wrote another petition to the Sublime Porte. This time he charged the Unionist branch in Sivas for rigging the municipal elections.<sup>89</sup>

After 20 months as the governor of Sivas, Alaaddin Bey was dismissed during Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's cabinet, which stated officially that he was discharged because he could not be able to preserve his impartiality over the new government in which the petition of Osman Paşazâde was pretended as the reason behind.<sup>90</sup> However, it could be considered that it was

one of the strategies adopted by the new government against the CUP-linked governors as Alaaddin Bey was not alone who was dismissed during the Muhtar Pasha cabinet. After the CUP regained its political authority with the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*, Alaaddin Bey also reappointed as the governor, but this time to Basra in March 1913.

Ahmed Nedim Efendi is another figure who had a similar fate with Alaaddin Bey. Before January 1912, he was working as an important figure within the *Duyun-u Umûmiye* as the general director. In March 1911 he was tasked with an additional duty that could subsequently make him a popular figure among the religious *tariqas*. He was appointed as the director (*emin*) of the office of the *Surre-i Hümayûn*.<sup>91</sup> After successful duties within the department as the *surre emini*,<sup>92</sup> he was appointed as the governor of Bitlis on 30 January 1912.<sup>93</sup> Once the religious *tariqas*' effects over the population in Bitlis are considered, such an appointment would then be more meaningful in terms of understanding that the interior ministry would have preferred a governor who had previous religious background. Ahmed Nedim Efendi, in that matter, seemed to be a proper candidate after his successful days under the *Surre Emâneti*. Moreover, the religious title of *effendi* was not prevalent among the governors, which in fact indicates religious attributions of an individual.

Pakalın mentions citing Ahmed Nedim Efendi's *sicill* that his successful days in *Duyun-u Umumiye* and *Surre-i Hümayûn* as well as his religious background which was stated as '*o havalî ahâlisinden bulunmuş olduğundan*' allowed him to be appointed as the governor of Bitlis on 30 January 1912.<sup>94</sup> However, very similar to the case of Alaaddin Bey, his position was terminated after seven months when Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha established his cabinet. Ahmed Nedim was officially dismissed because of his partisanship and grievances written against his so-called mismanagement.<sup>95</sup> The government appointed Ali Pasha who was former minister of Zabtîyah before the Revolution. After *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*, Ahmed Nedim wrote a petition to the government that he would like to be appointed as the governor of Hijaz on 10 April 1913.<sup>96</sup> In June 1913, his request was accepted as he was then appointed as the governor of Hijaz.<sup>97</sup>

Alaaddin Bey's and Ahmed Nedim Efendi's stories could be increased in number, but there were also certain other cases that tell the opposite. Certain governors were dismissed after the August 1909 when a constitutional amendment was passed but reappointed during the second half of 1912, on the contrary to the biographies of Alaaddin Bey and Ahmed Nedim Efendi indicated.

Cemal Bey, for example, was the former *mutasarrıf* of Kayseri and İzmid before 1910. For Pakalın, in 1910, he refused to be appointed as the *mutasarrıf* of Bolu, as then he started to live in Istanbul as well as founded an opponent newspaper named *Bedahet*.<sup>98</sup> The opposition during 1911 in the

*Bedahet* led him to be imprisoned until an amnesty was granted during 1912.<sup>99</sup> In July 1912, he returned to the state service as the district governor of Bolu and in September 1912, he was appointed as the governor of Mamuretülaziz.<sup>100</sup> In May 1913, he was discharged from all the duties from the state service.<sup>101</sup>

Ohannes Ferid Bey's case is somehow different than those above in terms of his lower-rank positions.<sup>102</sup> He was never appointed to be a governor, yet throughout his career he was either a vice-governor or a sub-governor. However, his career tells more about how non-CUP based ordinary bureaucrats could face certain difficulties. In 1884, he was graduated from the *Mülkiye* as his career started after his graduation as an ordinary level official. Until 1891, he had worked in certain different ministries when he was appointed as the qaymaqam of Kerpe. In 1892, he was awarded with meritorious service medal (*mecidi nişanı*).<sup>103</sup> He then promoted in 1896 when he was appointed as the vice-governor of Van<sup>104</sup> as the position maintained eleven years until the January 1908. During his duty as vice-governorship, there are certain reports acclaiming his attitudes and demanded gratifying him (*taltif*).<sup>105</sup> However, after his brother Armanak Efendi was assassinated by Armenian guerrillas, he asked his transfer.<sup>106</sup> In December 1907, he was then appointed as the vice-governor of Mamuretülaziz.<sup>107</sup> Soon after the 1908 Revolution, he was awarded the state medal of France, *Officiel d'Academie*.<sup>108</sup> Then he was appointed as the vice-governor of Kosova in December 1908,<sup>109</sup> and then sub-governor of Limni in October 1909,<sup>110</sup> as he soon was going to be dismissed from Limni. He was kept apart from the state service until appointing to Canik in September 1912 during the cabinet of Muhtar Pasha,<sup>111</sup> yet it also did not last longer as he was dismissed two months after the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*.<sup>112</sup> Within the following six years during the most powerful years of the CUP, he was kept apart from the state service until the January 1919.

Ohannes Ferid Bey's case is notable for illustrating that even a distinguished *Mülkiye* graduate and bureaucrat, who had been honored with various medals from both the Ottoman and French states and served several years as a vice-governor, could ultimately be dismissed during the CUP-dominated period in bureaucracy. In fact, Ohannes Ferid's case challenges the established literature, which asserts that revolutionary cadre formations were achieved by appointing appropriate individuals to the state cadres instead of the Monarchists, who were labeled as frauds.<sup>113</sup> However, this does not suggest that the Hamidian bureaucracy or governors affiliated with the Istanbul network were more merit-based than the CUP's cadres, or vice versa. This article contends that the networks within the bureaucratic sphere were engaged in a struggle to appoint governors aligned with them, while striving to prevent the appointments of rival networks, irrespective of merit.

## Conclusion

In the aftermath of June 1913, the Ottoman Empire witnessed a rapid infusion of the CUP within the state bureaucracy, heralding a pivotal shift towards authoritarian consolidation. This article argued that one of the key factors behind this transformation was the culmination of a series of strategic placements and conflicts within the state's bureaucratic framework between 1908 and 1913. Although this raises the question of whether the CUP followed an authoritarian agenda with a well-planned process, the overall attempt was merely to establish loyal bureaucratic cadres; however, this effort, whether consciously or unconsciously, facilitated the emergence of CUP authoritarianism after 1913. In other words, asserting that the CUP consciously pursued a plan towards authoritarianism between 1908 and 1913 by filling state cadres would be considered biased. The critical distinction is that the struggle over bureaucratic appointments during this period ultimately facilitated the CUP's transition to authoritarianism after 1913, regardless of whether the process was conscious or unconscious. This, in fact, challenges existing literature by asserting that the immediate emergence of CUP authoritarianism in 1913 was not solely caused by the Balkan Wars or corruption of power. Rather, it was also facilitated with the consolidation of power within the state bureaucracy which resulted in establishing a homogenous monopoly of power that, in fact, played a significant role in the rise of the CUP's authoritarianism. In fact, in 1913, while the CUP took complete control of the state apparatus, they did not face any rival bureaucratic setbacks from within the inner state organization unlike 1908. Therefore, this study argued that the authoritarian tilt of the CUP was not an instantaneous phenomenon but facilitated from prolonged and intense conflicts for control within the state bureaucracy.

In conclusion, while this study primarily concentrated on a unique phenomenon within the late Ottoman historical context, it also provides a distinct lens through which to examine authoritarianism across various distinct periods. Indeed, the CUP's strategies and the resultant bureaucratic dominance not only underscore the complexities inherent in the quest for state control but also illuminate broader themes of political maneuvering, suppression of dissent, and the consolidation of power. Subsequent studies could particularly explore the extent to which intra-state conflicts and competition for control over bureaucratic mechanisms have the potential to precipitate the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Thus, the insights derived from this analysis extend beyond the confines of the late Ottoman Empire, providing valuable perspectives on the dynamics of authoritarian governance and its implications across different historical contexts.



## Notes

1. Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim*, 341–99.
2. Hanioglu, *Preparation*, 313–15, and Hanioglu, “The Committee,” 15–26.
3. Taglia, *Intellectuals*, 7.
4. Özbek, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda,” 29–38.
5. Sohrabi, “Illiberal Constitutionalism,” 109–21.
6. Matossian, *Shattered Dreams*, 150.
7. Kaynar, “The Logic of Enlightenment,” 60.
8. Göçek, “What Is the Meaning,” 203.
9. Türkyılmaz, “Rethinking Genocide,” 46.
10. Kayalı, *Imperial Resilience*, 31.
11. Yıldırım, “Zafer Toprak,” 49.
12. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 313. For Hanioglu, the reasons for this disposition were irrespective of the intellectual aims of Young Turk intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary period.
13. Öztan, “Point of No Return?,” 65–84.
14. See Sarıay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı*, 196.
15. There are three primary ways to trace governor appointments. The first and most common method is through the state yearbooks, the *Salnâmes*. Scholars such as Şükrü Hanioglu, Abdülhamit Kırmızı, and Nader Sohrabi consulted the *Salnâmes* to study appointments in the higher strata of the bureaucracy (see Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 287; Kırmızı, “Abdülhamid’in Valileri”; and Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 201–03). However, for the period between 1908 and 1913, *Salnâme*-based analyses show fewer appointments compared to what is indicated in another archival record, the *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri*. The third method is through the *Takvim-i Vekâyi*, the official state newspaper, which provides daily information on appointments in the higher strata of the bureaucracy. Although governor appointments can be traced there, the *Tevcihât* records are more systematic and comprehensive. Therefore, this study prefers the *Tevcihât* records as the primary means to trace governor appointments.
16. Zürcher, “The Unionist presence,” 568–69.
17. Quoted from Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 286. According to Hanioglu, this draft memorandum dated October 4, 1908 was submitted to the CUP Monastir branch to be forwarded to the congress from the private papers of Bahaeddin Şakir.
18. Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi, hereafter BOA, DH.MKT. 2681/60, 19 *Zilkâde* 1326, 13 December 1908, “İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Merkez-i Umûmisi’nin tebliğ ve telkini üzerine Manastır Valiliği’ne Fahri Paşa’nın tayini.”
19. BOA. TFR.I.MKM. 31/3073, 16 *Şaban* 1326, 13 September 1908.
20. BOA. A. {DVNS.TVCM.d 3/4, p.5, no. 1351/25456, 27 *Ramazan* 1327, 12 October 1909.
21. BOA. A. {DVNS.TVCM.d. 3/8 p.13, 18 *Ramazan* 1328, 23 September 1910.
22. Toros, *Ali Münif Bey’in Hatıraları*, 57. Translated by the author.
23. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol. 4, 382. “Sultan Hamid’in meslekten yetişmiş tecribeli valilerinden sonra «İttihad ve Terakki» bir takım tecribesiz ve dirayetsiz adamları sırf İttihadçı olduklarından dolayı o zamanın büyük valiliklerine göndermiye başlamıştır: Bunların içinde bâzı



- komitacı zâbitler bile vardır! Meselâ Kosova valisi Mazhar Bey esasen sivil olmakla beraber tecribesiz bir komitacıdır.”
24. Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3, 315.
  25. Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli, 1839–1922*, 101.
  26. For his *sicill*, see BOA. DH. SAİD.d. 180/157. For his detailed biography, see Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi*, vol. 3, 315–16.
  27. Kapukaya, “Mehmet Ali Aynî’nin,” 75.
  28. For Arar, Mehmed Ali Aynî was retired by order of Talat while serving as the governor of Trabzon. See Arar, “Aynî, Mehmet Ali,” 273–75.
  29. Kırmızı used the term ‘*ideolojik irtidât*’. See Kırmızı, “Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları,” 345–51.
  30. *Tanin*, 25 Temmuz 1324, 4. “Valilerin Azli: İdare-i sâbkanın en mülevves vesait-i icraiyesinden, hafiyelerinden, zalimlerinden olan Hicaz Valisi Râtıb, Erzurum Valisi Adbü’l-vehab, Trabzon Valisi Ferid, Kastamonu Valisi Fuad, Beyrut Valisi Mehmed Ali, Adana Valisi Bahri Pasha ve Beyler azil edilmiştir. İşte ahaliye emniyet verecek şeyler bu gibi icraatlerdir.”
  31. Kırmızı, “Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları,” 145–51.
  32. For Mehmed Tevfik Bey’s *sicill*, see (BOA.DH.SAİDd. 192/163); For his autobiography, see Hürmen, *Bir Devlet Adamının*, 1993.
  33. Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi*, vol. 3, 192–93, and Özcan, “Mehmed Tevfik Bey,” 536–37.
  34. Hürmen, *Bir Devlet Adamının*, 445–46.
  35. Ibid. 447.
  36. Ibid. 451–52.
  37. Ibid. 469–70.
  38. Ibid. 469.
  39. BOA. DH. MKT. 1243/4, 03 Safer 1326 (7 March 1908).
  40. BOA. BEO. 3369/252609, 08 Receb 1326 (6 August 1908).
  41. BOA. İ.TAL. 429/37, 20 Receb 1325 (29 August 1907).
  42. These networks were named by the author for convenience. Neither İstanbulites nor the target governors used these names.
  43. BOA. ZB. 627/26, 7 Mart 1325 (20 March 1909).
  44. BOA. DH. MKT. 2809/75, 21 Rebiülahir 1327 (12 May 1909).
  45. BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 Rebiülahir 1327 (18 May 1909).
  46. *Neyyir-i Hakikât*, 24 Nisan 1325 (7 May 1909), 2. (A copy of the newspaper was included with the document BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 Rebiülahir 1327 (18 May 1909)).
  47. *Saadet Gazetesi*, 29 Nisan 1325 (12 May 1909), 2. (A copy of the newspaper was included with the document BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 Rebiülahir 1327 (18 May 1909)).
  48. BOA. DH. MKT. 2818/98, 29 Rebiülahir 1327 (20 May 1909).
  49. BOA. DH. MKT. 2825/26, 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1327 (29 May 1909).
  50. BOA. BEO. 3611/270781, 18 Receb 1327 (5 August 1909).
  51. BOA. DH. MKT. 2906/13, 3 Şaban 1327 (20 August 1909).
  52. BOA. BEO. 3682/276095, 15 Zilhicce 1327 (28 December 1909).
  53. BOA. DH. MUİ. 70/26, 20 Safer 1328 (3 March 1910).
  54. Karabekir, *İttihat*, 186.
  55. BOA. DH.MKT. 2679/59, 16 Zilkade 1326 (10 December 1908).
  56. Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum*, 69.
  57. Ibid.

58. BOA. İ.DH. 1468/32, 12 *Receb* 1326 (10 August 1908).
59. BOA. DH.MKT. 2679/59, 16 *Zilkade* 1326 (10 December 1908).
60. BOA. TFR.I.M. 22/2141, 11 *Şaban* 1326 (8 September 1908).
61. BOA. ŞD. 3064/20, 29 *Şevval* 1327 (13 November 1909).
62. For supporters and opponents of the *hakimiyet-i milliye*, see Kuyaş, "II. Meşrutiyet," 50–64.
63. Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi*, 184.
64. BOA. BEO 3502/262633, 8 *Safer* 1327 (1 March 1909).
65. Kunalp, *Son Dönem*, 104.
66. BOA. A.}MKT.MHM 216/91, 19 *Şevval* 1277 (30 April 1861).
67. Kunalp, *Son Dönem*, 104.
68. Rey, *Gördüklerim*, 28, 61.
69. Ibid., 28–9.
70. Ibid., 27–32.
71. Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi*, vol. 3, 329.
72. For Fahri Pasha's CUP origin, see Aydoğan and Eyyüboğlu, *Bahaeddin Şakir Bey'in i*, 445, and Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 323–24.
73. Birinci, *Hürriyet*, 55.
74. Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, 142–43.
75. For a detailed chronology of the period from January 1910 to December 1911, see Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 103–53; Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler*, 175–91; Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, 174–95; and Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim*, 163–295.
76. Birinci, *Hürriyet* v, 191.
77. Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları*, 61.
78. BOA. İ.DH. 1495/5, 29 *Ramazan* 1330 (11 September 1912).
79. Birinci, "Mehmed Galib Bey."
80. Birinci, *Tarihin Gölgesinde*, 180. 'Burada asıl sebep kendisinin İttihatçı devletliler nazarında uslu ve uysal bir vali olamamasıdır.'
81. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 57–65.
82. Aydın, "Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa."
83. For the Albanian uprising, see Suat Zeyrek, "II. Meşrutiyette," 299–336.
84. Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 103–41.
85. BOA. DH.MTV 1/30, 20 *Muharrem* 1329 (21 January 1911).
86. Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli*, vol. 2, 119. 'Vekaletde ibraz eylediği müessir kâr-güzar-ı umur-ı vilâyeti hüsn-ü tedvir ve temşiyete liyakat göstermesine mebni.'
87. BOA. DH.MTV 1/51, 18 *Ramazan* 1329 (12 September 1911).
88. BOA. DH.MTV 23/9, 11 *Receb* 1330 (26 June 1912).
89. BOA.DH.MUİ 160/86, 29 *Şaban* 1330 (13 August 1912).
90. Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli*, vol. 2, 119. 'Umur ve muamelat-ı hükümete bittarafılık iltizam edemediği müracat ve şikayat-ı vakı'adan anlaşılmasına binaen.'
91. BOA.BEO. 3869/290125, 16 *Rebiülevvel* 1329 (17 March 1911).
92. *Surre emaneti* is an institution which provided security for gifts sent from Istanbul to Mecca and Medina during Hajj. See Buzpınar, "Surre," 567–69.
93. BOA. A.}DVNS.TVCHM.d, 3/17, 32–33, 10 *Safer* 1330 (30 January 1912).
94. Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli*, vol. 13, 69–70. 'Müddet-i medide-i umur-u hükümete hidemât-ı hasenesi mesbuk ve tecrübe ve iktidari ve her suretle itimâd-ı mazhariyeti nezaretce malum olup ahiren surre emaneti memuriyetinde de reviyetini irade ve ispat etmiş ve esasen o havali ahalisinden bulunmuş olduğundan.'

95. Ibid. 'İntihabât ve sair hususâtta tarafgirâne hareketten ve su-i idaresinden dolayı hakkında şikayât vuku' bulunmakta olmasına binaen'.
96. BOA.HSDHADB. 1/3, 28 Mart 1329 (10 April 1913).
97. BOA.MV. 231/159, 27 Cemaziyelahir 1331 (3 June 1913).
98. Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli*, vol. 4, 94–5.
99. Ibid.
100. BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCHM.d. 3/25, p.48, n.1646/4511, 11 Şevval 1330 (23 September 1912).
101. Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli*, v.4, 95.
102. For his short biography, see Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye*, vol. 3, 178–79.
103. BOA.DH.MKT. 1992/57, 1 Safer 1310 (25 August 1892).
104. BOA.İ.DH.. 1336/54, 28 Safer 1314 (8 August 1896).
105. For example, see BOA.DH.MKT. 626/67, 4 Şevval 1320 (4 January 1903).
106. BOA.DH.ŞFR. 384/86, 9 Temmuz 1323 (22 July 1907).
107. BOA.İ.DH.. 1461/15, 27 Şevval 1325 (3 December 1907).
108. BOA.DH.MKT. 2625/69, 12 Ramazan 1326 (8 October 1908).
109. BOA.İ.DH.. 1471/74, 16 Zilkade 1326 (10 December 1908).
110. Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye*, vol. 3, 178–79.
111. BOA.BEO. 4082/306082, 27 Ramazan 1330 (9 September 1912).
112. BOA.İ.DH.. 1498/14, 29 Rebiülevvel 1331 (8 March 1913).
113. See Kansu, 1908 *Devrimi*, 156–57.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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\* The Tevcihat-ı Mülkiye Defterleri only includes the dates of governors' appointments, without specifying their dismissal dates. To maintain consistency within the *Tevcihat-ı Mülkiye* and relying solely on the data contained in these documents, two methods were employed to estimate the dismissal dates: if a governor was appointed to another position, it was assumed that their tenure in the previous position ended at the time of the new appointment. Alternatively, if a successor was appointed, it was inferred that the former governor's service had concluded. The earliest of these events was taken as the dismissal date.